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Abstract
Selection can favour the evolution of individually costly dispersal if this alle-
viates competition between relatives. However, conditions that favour altru-
istic dispersal also mediate selection for other social behaviours, such as
public goods cooperation, which in turn is likely to mediate dispersal evolu-
tion. Here, we investigate – both experimentally (using bacteria) and theo-
retically – how social habitat heterogeneity (i.e. the distribution of public
goods cooperators and cheats) affects the evolution of dispersal. In addition
to recovering the well-known theoretical result that the optimal level of
dispersal increases with genetic relatedness of patch mates, we find both
mathematically and experimentally that dispersal is always favoured when
average patch occupancy is low, but when average patch occupancy is high,
the presence of public goods cheats greatly alters selection for dispersal. Spe-
cifically, when public goods cheats are localized to the home patch, higher
dispersal rates are favoured, but when cheats are present throughout avail-
able patches, lower dispersal rates are favoured. These results highlight the
importance of other social traits in driving dispersal evolution.
Introduction
Understanding dispersal is a major aim of evolutionary
ecology (Weins, 2001). Theoretical work suggests that
dispersal provides possible benefits when the environ-
ment varies in time (Van Valen, 1971; McPeek & Holt,
1992) and if it reduces inbreeding depression (Bengts-
son, 1978) and kin competition (Hamilton & May,
1977). Conversely, dispersal can be opposed by obvious
costs, such as increased mortality or reduced reproduc-
tion (Rousset & Gandon, 2002; Bonte et al., 2012). The
indirect fitness benefits of dispersal, that arise owing to
it alleviating kin competition, highlight that dispersal is
often a social trait and that it can be favoured by kin
selection even in the context of severe fitness penalties
for the dispersing individuals (Hamilton & May, 1977;
Comins et al., 1980; Taylor & Frank, 1996; Gandon &
Michalakis, 1999; Taylor & Buckling, 2010; Wei et al.,
2011). The evolution of altruistic traits often requires
high relatedness, and in terms of dispersal, this would
mean a tendency for individuals who share the same
‘dispersal alleles’ to be associated in space. However,
dispersal itself is likely to reduce relatedness, which in
turn can reduce selection for dispersal (Taylor, 1988;
Gandon, 1999; Gandon & Michalakis, 1999; Ronce,
2007).
The change in population structure resulting from
dispersal is likely to have particularly important conse-
quences for the evolution of dispersal rates when other
social traits have important fitness consequences (Perrin
& Lehmann, 2001 and references therein; Le Galliard
et al., 2005). High relatedness, as well as selecting for
elevated dispersal rates, also selects for other forms of
altruism, where individuals pay a cost for the benefit of
the group as a whole (Hamilton, 1964). In contrast to
dispersal, where leaving the group is often an altruistic
act, many altruistic traits require individuals to stay in
groups. This has led to the development of theoretical
models that address coevolution between social
behaviours and dispersal behaviour (Koella, 2000;
Perrin & Lehmann, 2001; Le Galliard et al., 2005). A
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key prediction from these models is that selection for
dispersal will be reduced when other cooperative
behaviours have important direct or indirect fitness
benefits.
We investigate how selection for dispersal in bacteria
is influenced when individuals are cooperating (or not)
by the production of public goods. Wild-type bacteria
produce numerous extracellular molecules, such as tis-
sue degrading enzymes, iron-scavenging siderophores
and sticky polymers, to protect surface-growing bacteria
(biofilms), which are individually costly but benefit the
group as a whole (West et al., 2007). Such behaviours
are readily exploitable by nonproducing cheats; hence,
dispersal might be selected against in public good
producing bacteria if it increases the chance of encoun-
tering exploiting cheats. Conversely, selection for dis-
persal may be beneficial if it allows escape from social
exploitation or if it promotes individuals to move from
saturated to empty patches. We investigate how the
evolution of dispersal is affected by public goods pro-
duction and exploitation when exploiters are locally
(i.e. exhibit low patch occupancy) or widely (i.e. exhi-
bit high patch occupancy) distributed. We define patch
occupancy as the fraction of patches that are occupied.
We explore this result experimentally and theoretically,
with the aim to link empirical data with general theory
of the evolution of dispersal.
We use a well-studied bacteria model for social
evolution, the opportunistic bacterial pathogen, Pseudo-
monas aeruginosa. Pseudomonas aeruginosa possesses a
range of motility mechanisms, which trade-off against
each other, to move in different environments (Bardy
et al., 2003; Taylor & Buckling, 2011). We manipulate
dispersal behaviour using two genetically modified pili
mutants of P. aeruginosa, which in a semi-solid agar
plate show disparate dispersal behaviours: one acts as a
‘disperser’ and is able to quickly colonize the plate due
to the ability to move freely through the substrate; the
other acts as a ‘nondisperser’ and is unable to colonize
the plate as quickly due to restricted movement (details
of genotypes are given in Materials and methods).
Consistent with theoretical results, our previous work
using these mutants has shown that conditions of high
relatedness favour the disperser (Taylor & Buckling,
2010).
Pseudomonas aeruginosa produces numerous public
goods but, for simplicity, we focus upon a single trait:
extracellular iron-chelating siderophores (Ratledge &
Dover, 2000; West & Buckling, 2003). Iron is vital for
bacterial growth; however, most iron in the natural
environment exists in the insoluble ferric form and
must be reduced via reactions initiated by siderophore
molecules to be utilized. Under conditions of iron limi-
tation, clonal populations of siderophore producers
reach much higher densities (and lead to more severe
infections) than isogenic mutants that do not produce
the primary siderophore, pyoverdin (West & Buckling,
2003). However, nonproducing mutants can exploit the
pyoverdin of producers and hence outcompete them,
when in direct competition as a result of the metabolic
cost of pyoverdin production (Griffin et al., 2004).
Materials and methods
Strain details and growth conditions
Two transposon mutants defective in type IV pili and
generated from a wild-type strain of P. aeruginosa
(PAO1) were used as dispersing phenotypes: PilA acts
as the disperser as it is absent of pili (surface organelles
which aid motility on hard surfaces), and PilU acts as
the nondisperser as it is able to express but unable to
retract pili (hyperpiliated) (D’Argenio et al., 2001).
These mutants are isogenic, and hence, siderophore
production does not differ between strains. A soft agar
medium creates conditions whereby PilA is able to
move freely through the substrate, whereas the drag
caused by permanently extruded pili causes PilU to
become stuck. A third mutant defective in siderophore
production (PAO1DpvdD pchEF; Ghysels et al., 2004)
was used as the ‘cheat’. This strain is unable to grow in
isolation in an iron-limited environment and requires
access to a siderophore-producing strain to grow. The
dispersing phenotype of the cheat is intermediate
between PilA and PilU; therefore, PilA is able to
disperse beyond the range of cheats, but PilU is not.
For comparison, a wild-type PAO1 strain was used as
the ‘cooperator’ (its dispersing phenotype is equivalent
to the cheats, but they produce siderophores and there-
fore do not impose a social cost). Bacterial cultures
were grown overnight at 37 °C in 6 mL Casamino acid
media (CAA) shaken at 0.9 g. Cells were then pelleted
and resuspended in M9 buffer solution twice to ensure
that all nutrients were removed from the media.
Any free iron which potentially remained in resus-
pended cultures was removed by the addition of an
iron chelator (100 lg mL1 of human apo-transferrin
and 20 mM NaHCO3; Sigma; Meyer et al., 1996; Griffin
et al., 2004). Bacteria were left to grow and disperse for
72 h.
Treatment conditions
Our simple factorial experimental design involved
determining the fitness (growth) of cooperating dispers-
ers (PilA) and nondispersers (PilU) in the presence of
one of two competitors – cheats (exploiter) or coopera-
tors (WT) – which were distributed throughout the
plate (high-occupancy treatment) or only present in
the inoculation site (low-occupancy treatment). This
resulted in eight experimental treatments (Fig. 1).
A total of 25 mL of iron-limited CAA agar (0.6% w/v
agar) was poured into 20-cm-diameter Petri dishes and
allowed to dry in the laminar flow hood for 20 min.
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Agar plates used for high-occupancy treatment were
supplemented with 250 lL (approximately 109 cells)
overnight competitor culture (either cheat or coopera-
tor), and the other half remained bacteria free. Inocu-
lum was prepared as follows: (i) low-occupancy
treatment: competitors (cheats or cooperators) were
mixed in an Eppendorf with each of the dispersal
variants (disperser or nondisperser) at 1 : 10; (ii)
high-occupancy treatment: pure disperser (PilA) and
nondisperser (PilU) cultures were used as the inoculum,
and 2.5 lL of inoculum (approximately 107 cells) was
pipetted into the centre of the agar plate of the
corresponding treatment group (i.e. low-occupancy or
high-occupancy treatment). Each treatment was repli-
cated three times.
It was necessary to address whether pleiotropic
effects from the deleted PilA and PilU genes could lead
to one of the dispersing variants being an intrinsically
worse competitor than the other, due to costs incurred
from pili production (or lack of). Cooperator and cheat
strains were acting as environmental factors to dispers-
ing strains, and their competitive behaviour was not
the focus of this study, but is considered elsewhere
(e.g. Jiricny et al., 2010; K€ummerli et al., 2009a). We
compared growth rates (to test the relative fitness of
the disperser (PilA) with the nondisperser (PilU)) under
conditions where motility would confer little or no
advantage. We grew the dispersal variants together
(approximately 1.2 9 107 cells of disperser and nondis-
perser) at 37 °C in 6 mL liquid KB shaken at 0.9 g and
found growth rates to be equivalent (Wilcoxon,
P = 0.993). In addition, we also competed the geno-
types where bacteria were evenly inoculated through-
out soft agar; hence, moving from one colonized ‘patch’
would simply result in entering another. Again, we
found no significant difference in relative fitness
between the two strains (Wilcoxon, P = 0.14).
Data collection
Methods were as in Taylor & Buckling (2010). Samples
were taken using a 1-mL pipette (Finn pipette), at
regular 5-mm intervals along the radius of the colony.
The samples were then washed in M9 buffer
(12.8 g L1 Na2HPO4, 3 g L
1 KHPO4, 0.5 g L
1 NaCl,
1 g L1 NH4Cl), diluted to an appropriate dilution to
allow colony differentiation and plated to count
colony-forming units (CFUs). The relative fitness is
always measured between dispersers (PilA) and nondis-
persers (PilU), and determined by calculating the ratio
of the total number of each cell type across correspond-
ing plates. The nature of the experimental design
means that in some treatments, there are competitors
present, and in others, they are not. However, the fully
factorial design of the experiment means that all combi-
nations are comparable.
Visual differentiation was made between sidero-
phore-producing (green) and nonproducing colonies
(white) on KB agar. In plates where all strains were
cooperators, differentiation could be made between dis-
persal variants by the colony morphology: on hard
agar, the wild-type cooperator (which has fully func-
tional pili) can move more efficiently than the dispersal
variants and therefore produces larger colonies than the
dispersing or nondispersing phenotypes. The relative
fitness of dispersers (PilA) vs. nondispersers (PilU) was
Fig. 1 Methods for setting up the eight
treatment groups: competition is either
low or high occupancy; the competitor
is either a cooperator or a cheat; and
the dispersing variant is either a
disperser (PilA) or a nondisperser
(PilU). Under the high-occupancy
treatment, agar is supplemented with a
competitor strain (either a cooperator or
cheat), which will compete for space
and resources. The disperser or
nondisperser is inoculated into the
centre of each plate. Under high-
occupancy treatment, this inoculum is
pure, but under low-occupancy
treatment, this inoculum is mixed with
one of the competitor strains at a
concentration of 10 : 1.
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determined by dividing the cell density of dispersers by
the cell density of nondispersers across randomly paired
plates within the same treatment group (for example:
disperser vs. nondisperser under treatment, competi-
tor = cheat; competitor distribution = high occupancy).
All analyses and figures were produced on PASW
Statistics 18 (SPSS; part of IBM UK Ltd, Middlesex, UK).
Theoretical model
To link the empirical data with the existing general the-
ory of dispersal evolution, we developed a theoretical
model to investigate the dynamics between public
goods cooperation and kin competition in the context
of evolving dispersal behaviour. Our model is relatively
simple, as we are mostly interested in qualitative pre-
dictions, but it nevertheless captures the main aspects
of our experimental design and enables generalization
to other populations. We derived an expression for the
personal fitness of a cooperator exhibiting a rare genetic
variant dispersal strategy. We assume that only cooper-
ators are able to disperse (with varying probability),
and therefore, the genetic variation for dispersal is only
in cooperators. Thus, this genetic variation at the dis-
persal locus does not correlate with genetic variation at
the cooperation locus (because cooperation is constant
among cooperators). We then employed a neighbour-
modulated fitness approach to kin selection analysis
(Taylor, 1996; Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 1997,
1998; Rousset, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007) to identify the
evolutionary equilibrium rate of dispersal, which we
then checked for convergence stability (Eshel, 1983;
Taylor, 1996).
We assume an infinite metapopulation with three
types of patches that vary in their quality (where patch
quality is defined by their carrying capacity). Each
patch type occurs at a given fixed frequency in the
population, which is independent of trait value. A pro-
portion a of patches can contain both cooperator and
cheat bacterial cells (‘occupied patches’), a proportion b
of patches are empty (‘vacant patches’) and a propor-
tion c = 1-(a+b) of patches contain only cheats (‘cheat
patches’). Under this patch arrangement, the only way
to escape social cheats is by dispersing to another patch.
As in the experimental design, we assume that these
quantities are fixed parameters.
We denote the genetic relatedness (with respect to
the genes for dispersal) among cooperators within
patches by r. Each cooperator disperses with indepen-
dent probability z to a random patch or else remains in
their natal patch with probability 1-z. Following dis-
persal, bacteria reproduce asexually, with cooperators
reaching carrying capacities of aK in occupied patches,
(1-a)K in vacant patches and 0 in cheat patches. Thus,
by varying the value of the parameter a between 0 and
1, we are able to investigate the whole range of possi-
bilities for the impact of patch occupancy upon carrying
capacity, from occupied patches having vastly lower
carrying capacity (a?0) to vastly greater carrying
capacity (a?1), than vacant patches. The parameter K
acts as a scaling factor, to reflect that there may be
numerous bacterial cells in a patch. Note, that the
carrying capacity aK includes the cooperators already
present in the patch and any new migrants that enter.
This parameter defines the carrying capacity of the focal
strain only, rather than that of the total bacterial popu-
lation. That is, we allow for occupancy (relative to
vacancy) to either deteriorate a patch, resulting in a
decreased carrying capacity (a < 1/2), or improve a
patch, resulting in an increased carrying capacity
(a > 1/2). A simple biological interpretation of this
difference is that social cheats reduce carrying capacity
in the former, and the presence of public goods cooper-
ators increases carrying capacity in the latter (Griffin
et al., 2004). For example, (i) migration to empty
patches might have a phenotypic effect on cooperators
that reduce their ability to cooperate (as in the ‘benefits
of philopatry’ hypothesis; Stacey & Ligon, 1987, 1991),
or (ii) empty patches may be intrinsically inferior habi-
tats (as in the ‘habitat saturation’ hypothesis; Emlen,
1982). In other words, cheats effectively act as an envi-
ronmental hazard which will reduce the fitness of
cooperators who share their space (cf. Frank, 2010) –
the relative density of cooperators to cheats will deter-
mine carrying capacity of the patch and as such the
fitness cost imposed. We assume that cheats do not dis-
perse because further growth is impossible for a cooper-
ator in a pure cheat patch, and cheats are unable to
survive in the absence of cooperators. A key assump-
tion in this model is that cheats do not disperse,
whereas cheats within the experimental setting exhibit
intermediate dispersal. However, the important factor is
that dispersers are able to escape cheats, whereas
nondispersers cannot, and this was also the case in the
experiments. Cooperators can occupy a patch by them-
selves if they disperse to empty patches, and when
a = 0.5 and c = 0, then our model behaves as if all
patches were cooperators only. Given these assump-
tions, cooperators can only exhibit meaningful growth
in initially occupied patches and in vacant patches.
Taken together, these two types of patches make up a
fraction a + b of the total population. Thus, it is conve-
nient to define the proportion of habitable patches that
are occupied as p = a/(a+b). Full details are given in
the Data S1.
Results
Experimental
We measured the relative fitness of the dispersers (PilA)
compared with the nondispersers (PilU) for each of the
eight treatments (resulting in four average relative
fitness values, because each comparable treatment for
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dispersers and nondispersers would be randomly paired,
and the relative fitness value between the treatments cal-
culated) (Fig. 2). The effect of high-occupancy vs. low-
occupancy conditions on the relative fitness of the
disperser depended on whether the dispersers were com-
peting with cheats or cooperators (Two-way ANOVA, inte-
raction between Treatment*Competitor; F1,8 = 17.215;
P = 0.003). Specifically, it is better to disperse when
cheats occupy patches at a low rate (One-sample t-test,
test value = 1: t2 = 14.28; P = 0.01), but better to remain
sessile when cheats are at high occupancy and distrib-
uted throughout the environment (One-sample t-test,
test value = 1: t2 = 374.71; P < 0.001). By contrast, the
disperser maintains a fitness advantage across both treat-
ment groups in the presence of cooperators (One-sample
t-test, test value = 1: low occupancy, t2 = 7.79;
P = 0.032; high occupancy, t2 = 41.42; P = 0.002).
Theoretical
We use our model assumptions to determine the conver-
gence stable (CS; Eshel & Motro, 1981; Eshel, 1983;
Christiansen, 1991; Taylor, 1996) dispersal strategy, z*
(see Theoretical model, Materials and methods and Data
S1). An important special case of our model is where we
assume the absence of vacant patches (b = 0, and hence
p = 1) and clonal relatedness among the cooperators in
each patch (r = 1): this is equivalent to the model of
Hamilton & May (1977), and here, we recover their key
result, z* = 1/(1 + c), where the cost of dispersal (c) is
simply the probability of landing upon a cheat patch
(i.e. c = c). In this classic model, increasingly costly dis-
persal favours a lower rate of dispersal. However, a sur-
prisingly high rate of dispersal is nonetheless favoured
despite even extreme costs (e.g. z*?1/2 as c?1).
More generally, analysis of our model reveals that
relatedness (r), costs of dispersal (c = c), the proportion
of habitable patches that are occupied (p = a/(a+b)) and
the relative carrying capacity of occupied patches (a)
can interact to mediate the evolution of dispersal.
Increasing genetic relatedness of cooperators (with
respect to the dispersal genes they carry) within patches
always increases the CS rate of dispersal (dz*/dr > 0).
This is because the indirect fitness benefits of dispersal,
owing to the relaxation of resource competition for
one’s kin, scale with the relatedness of patch mates.
When occupation deteriorates patches (a ≤ 1/2), then
increasing the proportion of habitable patches that are
occupied (p) always decreases the CS rate of dispersal
(dz*/dp < 0). When occupation improves patches
(a > 1/2), the CS rate of dispersal may be either an
increasing or a decreasing function of the proportion of
habitable patches that are occupied (p). This is because,
even if occupation improves patches, dispersers may
still be better off if they land on an unoccupied patch,
as there are more individuals competing for resources
on occupied patches. Hence, the direct fitness of a
disperser may increase or decrease with the proportion
of occupied patches (higher p), depending upon
whether the improvement or competition effect domi-
nates. In contrast, the indirect fitness of a disperser
always decreases with increasing abundance of occu-
pied patches (higher p), because it is increasingly likely
that the freed up opportunities for reproduction in her
natal patch will be won by immigrants rather than her
nondispersing kin. Increasing the relative carrying
capacity of occupied patches (a) always reduces the CS
rate of dispersal (dz*/da < 0). This is because any direct
benefit of dispersal owes to the individual finding her-
self in a patch that is better than the one that she dis-
persed away from.
The relationship between the cost of dispersal (c)
and the CS rate of dispersal (z*) is qualitatively
affected by both the proportion of habitable patches
that are occupied (p) and relatedness (r). Increasing
mortality cost of dispersal always reduces the direct
fitness effect of dispersal and always increases the
indirect fitness effect of dispersal. In Hamilton & May’s
(1977) classic model, the former effect always
outweighs the latter, such that increasing mortality
cost always reduces the CS rate of dispersal. However,
this is not true in our more elaborate model.
Consequently, whereas the CS rate of dispersal is
Fig. 2 Average fitness of dispersers (PilA) relative to nondispersers
(PilU) in environments which vary in competitor type which form
the social neighbourhood (dispersal variants are competing with
either cooperators or cheats), and the structure of the social
neighbourhood, with competitors distributed throughout the agar
(high occupancy) or located only within the colonization patch
(low occupancy). Error bars represent  95% CI, and the dashed
line indicates a relative fitness of 1, that is, when the fitness of the
disperser and the nondisperser are equivalent.
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sometimes monotonically decreasing with increasing
mortality cost for some parameter values, for others, it
may be a U-shaped function of the mortality cost (see
also Gandon & Michalakis, 1999; Ronce, 2007). These
results are summarized in Fig. 3.
a 0.25
r 1.00
i
ii
0 1
0
1
a 0.50
r 1.00iv
iii
0 1
0
1
a 0.75
r 1.00
0 1
0
1
a 0.25
r 0.50
0 1
0
1
a 0.50
r 0.50
0 1
0
1
a 0.75
r 0.50
0 1
0
1
a 0.25
r 0.00
0 1
0
1
a 0.50
r 0.00
0 1
0
1
a 0.75
r 0.00
0 1
0
1
Cost of dispersal (c)
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 o
cc
up
ie
d 
pa
tc
he
s (
P)
Fig. 3 Contour plots of the convergence stable (CS) rate of dispersal (z*), as a function of the cost of dispersal (c; abscissae), the proportion of
habitable patches that are occupied (p; ordinates), the relative carrying capacity of occupied patches (a; columns) and the coefficient of genetic
relatedness (r; rows). The scale varies from z* = 0 (no dispersal, white) to z* = 1 (full dispersal, black). The CS rate of dispersal (z*) decreases as
the carrying capacity of the home patch (a) or the proportion of habitable patches that are occupied (p) increases, and decreases as the genetic
relatedness within patches (r) increases. The relation between the CS rate of dispersal (z*) and the cost of dispersal (c) is more complicated, and
is mediated by relatedness (r). For relatively low relatedness (r = 0.00, 0.50), the CS rate of dispersal (z*) decreases monotonically with the
cost of dispersal (c). For relatively high relatedness (r = 1.00), the CS probability of dispersal (z*) is a U-shaped function of the cost of dispersal
(c). The arrows indicate the points in the parameter space that correspond to the four treatments of Fig. 1, hence: (i) low patch occupancy and
cheats as social neighbourhood; (ii) high patch occupancy and cheats as social neighbourhood; (iii) low patch occupancy population and
cooperators as social neighbourhood; (iv) high patch occupancy population and cooperators as social neighbourhood.
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We now summarize the model results to qualitatively
answer our main question: how does the presence of
public goods cheats affect the evolution of dispersal
under high patch occupancy and low patch occupation?
Under low-occupancy conditions (b is high, a is low, and
hence, p is low), dispersal will always evolve to be high
(Fig. 2), because there are no costs of dispersal, only ben-
efits, regardless of whether cheats are present (low a) or
absent (high a) in occupied patches. Under high-occu-
pancy conditions (b is low, and hence, p is high) in the
absence of cheats (high a), dispersal also evolves to a
high level, despite surrounding patches affording equal
growth as the home patch, as a result of indirect fitness
benefits: dispersal alleviates local kin competition (Ham-
ilton & May, 1977). By contrast, high-occupancy condi-
tions with a high frequency of cheat patches (high c and
low a, with c < 1) result in the evolution of lower dis-
persal, because the home patch where there are coopera-
tors as well as cheats is a better environment than the
surrounding pure cheat patches (Fig. 3).
Discussion
In this study, we investigated how patch occupation
and social habitat heterogeneity affect the evolution of
dispersal. We compared the relative cell densities of
dispersing and nondispersing isogenic strains of the bac-
terium P. aeruginosa when cheats/cooperators were
locally and globally present. We found that dispersal
was always favoured when there were vacant patches
available to colonize (low patch occupancy), but when
patches were saturated (high patch occupancy), the
presence of public goods cheats greatly altered selection
for dispersal. Specifically, when public goods cheats
were localized to the home patch, higher dispersal rates
were favoured, but when cheats were present through-
out available patches, lower dispersal rates were
favoured. These results are qualitatively consistent with
our theoretical model.
The results can be explained by the dispersing morph
adopting a more risky strategy, depleting the numbers
in the inoculation site and exposing itself to potential
unknown costs within the environment (in this case,
the cheats). This strategy pays off when the dispersers
find themselves in high nutrient, virgin territory
beyond the threat of the cheats (as in the low-occu-
pancy treatment group), but dispersal is costly when
there is a strong probability that cheats wait beyond
the home site. On the other hand, the nondispersers
will not expose themselves to external threats and will
therefore dominate the home site – but not beyond –
in all treatment groups. This was particularly apparent
when cheats were at high patch occupancy: dispersers
did not appear to grow beyond the range of the inocu-
lation site, whereas nondispersers were able to slowly
migrate beyond this area. Presumably, this is because
the dispersers diminished their numbers in the inocula-
tion site as cells dispersed from the colonizing group,
whereas the nondispersers maintained relatively high
numbers in the inoculation site (because they are not
losing cells to dispersal events). We can rule out the
possibility that density dependence alone can explain
the results given above due to the fact that dispersers
reach a relatively higher density (i.e. are more fit)
when cheat occupation is low and limited to the home
patch. If the correlation between fitness and relatedness
(at the dispersal loci) were entirely due to density
dependence, dispersers should be even more fit when
cooperators are locally confined to the home patch,
because under these conditions, there will be a higher
density of dispersing cooperators.
Our theoretical model also investigated the interac-
tion between relatedness (with respect to dispersal
strategy), the presence of public goods cheats and patch
occupancy on the evolution of dispersal (Fig. 3). Relat-
edness was not manipulated in our experiment, experi-
mental populations were isogenic, consisting of either
dispersers or nondispersers, and this therefore corre-
sponds with a theoretical scenario in which r = 1. How-
ever, by allowing relatedness to vary in our theoretical
model, we were able to dissect the direct vs. indirect
fitness mediators of the evolution of dispersal and,
moreover, facilitate connections with the wider theoret-
ical literature on the social evolution of dispersal. To
understand this model effectively, it is important to
clarify that although relatedness will often depend
strongly on dispersal, it will not always. For example: if
patches are founded by a single cell, there will be clonal
relatedness within patches irrespective of the rate of
dispersal; alternatively, budding dispersal can also allow
for scenarios where dispersal is complete and there is
clonal relatedness (Gandon & Michalakis, 1999). How-
ever, low relatedness generally means that direct bene-
fits will drive the evolution of dispersal, such that patch
occupancy determines the fitness of dispersing pheno-
types: dispersal is favoured under low patch occupancy,
regardless of the presence of cheats (as in the models of
Van Valen, 1971; McPeek & Holt, 1992; Greenwood-
Lee & Taylor, 2001; Leturque & Rousset, 2002). Under
high relatedness, indirect benefits also drive the dis-
persal patterns, such that dispersal can be favoured
under higher values of patch occupancy, because
dispersal alleviates kin competition in the patch of ori-
gin (as in the models of Hamilton & May, 1977; Frank,
1986 and Gandon & Michalakis, 1999). Our model
emphasizes the relative impact of differences in an indi-
vidual’s social environment and patch occupancy upon
the evolution of dispersal. Our results are also in line
with those of Le Galliard et al. (2003, 2005), who have
analysed how altruism and mobility interact. They
suggested that cooperators can either exhibit high
mobility, owing to high local kin competition and rela-
tively low cost of mobility, or exhibit low mobility,
owing to high cost of mobility and relatively low local
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kin competition. This is identical to our conclusions.
However, whereas in their model, the cost of mobility
is due to an environmental factor, and in our case, the
analogous cost of dispersal is due to the presence of
cheats in the environment.
Whereas the combination of theory and empirical
work we present here helps us to both interpret and
generalize the results from our simple experiment, it is
important to emphasize the key limitations of our study.
First, we did not allow dispersal phenotypes to evolve as
a result of mutations generated de novo during the
course of the experiment, but instead relied on measur-
ing the fitness of defined mutants. Gene knockouts can
be associated with large pleiotropic effects that can
impact relative fitness between the strains. However,
controls in shaken liquid and soft agar showed no sig-
nificant difference in growth rate between the two
strains when motility was unlikely to confer any advan-
tage, and therefore, any fitness differences observed are
likely the result of the dispersal phenotypes.
Second, a number of our theoretical model assump-
tions may limit generality, and alternative assumptions
would change model predictions. We assumed that
cheats do not disperse, whereas cheats within the
experimental setting have intermediate dispersal. If
cheats were dispersers, we would expect contrasting
results. However, the key assumption in the model is
that dispersers are able to escape cheats, whereas
nondispersers cannot, and this was also the case in the
experiments. This provides a mechanism for coopera-
tors to escape cheat exploitation. Also, we defined relat-
edness only with respect to the dispersal strategy and
not with respect to public good production, because our
analysis concerns the evolution of the former rather
than the latter trait. More complex models, which con-
sider co-evolution of dispersal and cheating, would
need to compute relatedness for both of these traits.
However, using a combined empirical and theoretical
approach clarifies and expands results from the empiri-
cal study alone. This allows the results to be understood
in terms of direct and indirect fitness benefits that
shape the evolution of dispersal by breaking down the
factors of relatedness and patch quality.
Third, the social habitat in our experimental setup
was continuous, whereas the model defines a patch-
structured habitat. This limitation of the model allows
greater analytical tractability and is more true to the
experimental set-up. Lattice models differ from island
models in that they take into account the geographic
distance between subpopulations and individuals and
might therefore provide a better approximation to a
continuous habitat set-up (Rousset, 2004). However,
previous studies of kin competition in genetically struc-
tured populations show that patch-structured popula-
tions (Taylor, 1992a) and lattice-structured populations
(Taylor, 1992b) yield qualitatively similar predictions.
Moreover, a comparative analysis of the evolution of
dispersal in a homogeneous population under different
structures, ranging from patch-structured habitats to
several variations of lattice-structured habitats, shows
that although these different habitat structures give
slightly different quantitative results, the qualitative
results are similar (Gandon & Rousset, 1999). A partic-
ular major challenge for future studies, both theoreti-
cally and empirically, is to consider populations where
habitat structure co-evolves with traits to bridge the
gap between laboratory and natural settings (e.g. Jessup
et al., 2004; Johnson & Stinchcombe, 2007; Lion & van
Baalen, 2008; Lehmann & Rousset, 2010).
Fourth, our theoretical results are given in terms of
evolutionary endpoints, whereas the experimental
results concern evolving populations that have not yet
settled to equilibrium. This is a common limitation of
experimental evolutionary studies (Buckling et al.,
2009; K€ummerli et al., 2009b; Kawecki et al., 2012).
Indeed, this limitation is true of any application of com-
parative statics to biological populations. However, this
approach remains one of the most successful in advanc-
ing our understanding of the selective forces underlying
the adaptive evolution of organisms (Grafen, 1984,
1991; Frank, 1998 Ch 12; West, 2009).
Microbes engage in many collective actions, and this
usually requires the maintenance of a kin-structured
environment (Czaran & Hoekstra, 2009). For pathogens,
maintaining social behaviours – many of which are
important virulence factors (Rumbaugh et al., 2009) –
will also aid transmission by ensuring the host is inocu-
lated with an infective dose (Hall-Stoodley & Stoodley,
2005). Agrobacterium tumefaciens is a plant pathogen that
requires highly social groups to elicit a successful patho-
genic attack on a host, and it has recently been proposed
that for transmission to be effective, dispersal would
have to occur via budding (Platt et al., 2012). What is
less well explored is the additional mechanism this
behaviour might provide to escaping harmful invaders
such as predators (Matz & Kjelleberg, 2005), toxin
producers (Majeed et al., 2011), parasites (Wilson &
Sherman, 2010) or, indeed, cheats (Velicer, 2003).
The theoretical model offers generalization of our
results beyond the microbial world. There has been
much interest in investigating the role of kin competi-
tion and habitat saturation in driving the evolution of
dispersal, and hence, there are many empirical exam-
ples that demonstrate increased dispersal driven by kin
competition [such as in voles (Bollinger et al., 1993)
and insects (Kasuya, 2000)] and decreased dispersal
driven by local patch occupancy [as seen in kangaroo
rats (Jones, 1988), and black kites (Forero et al., 2002)].
However, here, we are assuming not only the number
of occupants, but also the nature of the occupants
(cooperators or cheats), will influence the evolution of
dispersal, and there is evidence that kin are often more
favourable neighbours than nonkin. For example,
many animals appear to show kin-biased habitat choice
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[for example in the crow (Baglione et al., 2003) and the
lizard (Sinervo & Clobert, 2003)], and in addition, it
has been shown that neighbour type (kin vs. nonkin)
can also impose selection on important fitness traits.
For example, in the Townsend’s vole (Microtus townsen-
dii), females tend to nest nearer to kin and those nest-
ing in close proximity with kin have higher survival
than those nesting near nonkin (Lambin & Krebs,
1993). Highly social organisms, such as the eusocial
hymenoptera, can overcome conflicts between the ben-
efits of dispersal and costs resulting from the break-
down of cooperation via budding dispersal – where
groups from a larger colony will disperse together to
ensure the founding colony will maintain high related-
ness (Ross & Keller, 1995; Gardner & West, 2006;
K€ummerli et al., 2009b). Here, we suggest that dispersal
can also provide a benefit to cooperative groups if it
offers the opportunity to run-away from invading
cheats; however, this risky strategy only pays off if
population structure is such that escape is possible. A
greater knowledge of the relative costs and benefits of
associating with kin and nonkin helps to explain this
result in more detail and adds to the body of work that
describes mechanisms for the observed diversity of
natural dispersal behaviours.
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